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Abstract The article describes the policy-making structure which governs the
reform of justice in Afghanistan. It is characterized by an evolution from a bilateral
to a multilateral approach, aimed at increasing the Afghan ownership. However,
observing the system ‘from within’, it seems currently ruled by a mixed regime,
being still deeply influenced by external inputs. As a consequence, the final outcome
of the process remains uncertain.
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Introduction
In early 2002, the reform of a large part of the Afghan public administration was
divided between ‘lead nations’, each one being in charge of managing the
reconstruction activities within a single sector of responsibility. Italy was entrusted
with the reform of justice. This mostly unilateral approach waned in 2006, being
considered redundant with the growing efforts of the Afghan government, aimed at
taking direct responsibility for the administration of courts and judicial personnel.
As a result, the new mantra among the donor community rapidly became that of the
‘local ownership’ of reform process. At the operational level, this principle was
implemented by reshaping comprehensively the whole decisional framework, in
order to secure the full participation of Afghan authorities in the decisional process.
In particular, the overall policy-making structure was aligned with the templates
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included in policies and guidelines set by major international financial institutions
(IFIs) for countries emerging from conflicts. In addition, Afghan authorities were
granted the presidency of all the consultative bodies established to support the
Executive in formulating sector policies. Eventually, this local ownership consol-
idating process has recently led to the adoption of a sector development strategy
(National Justice Sector Strategy) by the Afghan government, to be implemented
through a National Justice Programme. The latter’s key feature is the use of an
integrate funding structure to finance justice sector reform, through the creation of a
dedicated project, run jointly by Afghan justice institutions (Supreme Court,
Attorney General’s Office—AGO, Ministry of Justice—MoJ). The project will be
funded through the Afghanistan reconstruction trust fund (ARTF), which is in turn
participated by a number of contributing countries and administered by the World
Bank (WB).
On the other hand, however, the application of the local ownership principle
within the justice sector has suffered from a number of problems. At first, such
difficulties may be ascribed to the lack of organizational capacity and legal
experience among Afghan officials, corruption, dearth of skilled international
consultants to carry out aid programmes and the poor security conditions.1
Secondly, problems affecting sector development are due to a fragmented decision-
making process, at all levels, that hampers the system’s effectiveness and the full
application of the local ownership principle. The confusion of roles between
international and local players, together with the contradiction between official
statements and the reality on the ground (which often imposes external inputs in
order to fill the gaps of capacity and expertise among Afghan authorities), generates
a ‘mixed ownership’ regime within the existing institutional reform.
In this context, the study attempts to describe the evolution of the development
aid strategy within the reform of the shaky Afghan system of justice. More
specifically, the research analyses single approaches and effects of the current
reconstruction process, by giving a practitioner’s view of the ongoing activities
‘from within’. To this aim, it is first necessary to draw a broader picture of strategies
and frameworks used at international level to support the development of countries
recovering from conflicts. In view of this, the first section briefly illustrates the
major changes that occurred after the September 11 attacks in IFI development aid
policies. The second one presents the overall policy-making framework set up
according to such policies. There then follow three sections which outline the key
phases of the justice sector reform that have occurred so far. Indeed, such phases
have been marked up by three pivotal conferences, held in Bonn, London and
Rome, respectively. The sixth section discusses the progress towards the local
ownership of justice sector reform achieved after the Rome Conference, by offering
some examples taken from current activities. The article concludes that sector
reform is de facto still influenced by external players, generating a decision-making
process which is characterized by a national/international mixed regime.
1 See the recent statements made by Nipa Banerjee, former head of the Canadian International
Development Agency in Levitz 2008.
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A Major Change in the Overall Approach to Reconstruction Activities
The September 11 attacks in New York and Washington DC generated a vast
consensus among key actors participating in the international intervention in
Afghanistan over the leading policy to be implemented in the reconstruction
activities. It was agreed that, while the international assistance efforts should
combine into an integrated approach to support the political process, short-term
relief activities should turn rapidly into long-term investment strategies, aimed at
reducing poverty and consolidating the government authority all over the state
territory (Costy 2004: 145). In this respect, external assistance was mainly intended
to stabilize the Afghan state structure and provide legitimacy for the central
government, under a strategy that has been further labelled as ‘aid-induced
pacification’ (Stockton 2002: 25). This approach reflects a wider change at the
global level in the concept of humanitarian action, which becomes increasingly
professionalized and rationalized and whose purposes are now openly politicized
(Barnett 2005).
The peace-building strategy experimented in Afghanistan also comes at the end
of a process of transformation in the approach taken by IFIs towards countries
recovering from conflicts (Cammack 2006: 336). Some months before the beginning
of the international intervention, the WB had adopted its Operational Policy No.
2.30 (World Bank 2001) that sets the scope and the terms of its involvement in
conflict prevention activities,2 while since 1999 both the Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) had adopted a common broader approach to development
planning, called comprehensive development framework (CDF) which lays down
the framework for ‘concessionary’ lending, mostly through the mandatory adoption
of a poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP) by requesting countries (Wolfensohn
and Fischer 2000). A PRSP outlines the country’s macroeconomic, structural and
social policies and programmes over a 3-year or longer period. The PRSP aims at
promoting growth and reducing poverty, as well as identifying associated external
financing needs and major sources of financing (IMF 2008). The PRSP formula was
developed in order to respond to evident weaknesses in relations between poor
countries and IFIs—in particular the lack of country ownership of reforms (Bretton
Woods Project 2003). On the other hand, a major change was similarly affecting the
UN approach to peace-building. At the time of the intervention in Afghanistan, and
before, since 1999, the UN started to implement the concept of UN ‘integrated
mission’ in Kosovo, after the experience matured in the former Yugoslavia with the
adoption of a similar model based on single lead agencies. Indeed, integrated
missions are conceived to address situations of transition from war to peace through
a wide UN response, which subsumes relevant actors and policies within an overall
political-strategic crisis management framework (Eide et al. 2005: 4, 13). Under this
holistic approach, missions should immediately focus on capacity building
without jeopardizing the local ownership of the reform process. Therefore, if the
stabilization is now conceived as passing through an effective policy of aid
2 This policy should now be read in conjunction with the World Bank Operational Policy No. 8.00,
entitled ‘Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies’.
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assistance, the real objective of the reform process becomes that of structuring state
political economy so that participation is more rewarding than resistance for
opponents or spoilers (Jones 2004: 214).
Yet, while formally there may be a wide consensus among the key players within
the international scenario on whether to integrate their activities, it is still to be seen
how such integration is legitimized and then implemented. Generally, during the
most recent UN missions, like those in Afghanistan, Timor Leste, Iraq and Kosovo,
the role of IFIs within the country’s reconstruction has been partially provided by
Security Council resolutions, revealing ‘an important and developing legal
relationship between the IFIs and the UN’ (Boon 2007: 515). Hence, as the Afghan
experience clearly shows, operationally the reform process has been run according
to policies and manuals for low income countries under stress (LICUS), developed
mostly by the WB and the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD-DAC) (e.g. World Bank 2004;
OECD-DAC 2005). Such models have been applied both at macro and micro level,
i.e. within both the strategic and the operational structure of the new institutional
architecture. Therefore, while, on the one hand, the coordination among donors and
Afghan authorities has been characterized by the use of the ‘consultative group’
formula, on the other hand the formation of the National Development Budget has
been assisted by the IFIs through relevant inputs. The latter have taken the form of
close assistance and performance monitoring of Afghan institutions, partially by
means of joint assessment missions, as well as the perspective of short- and
medium-term financial assistance, as conditioned to the accomplishment of those
stages described in IFIs manuals. It is noteworthy that, as IFIs policies and
procedures themselves changed, they were immediately applied to the Afghan
reconstruction. Therefore, as the principles of local ownership, alignment,
harmonization, managing for results and mutual accountability emerged at
the Rome and Paris conferences on aid harmonization and effectiveness,3 the
international aid architecture was itself reformed and the aid programmes readapted
to comply with the new tenets.
Putting in Practice the Local Ownership Principle: The Consultative Groups
As previously anticipated, both the CDF approach and the aid harmonization
procedures developed by the OECD-DAC promote a model of development for
LICUS which is based on a particularly complex framework. Such articulated
structure is designed to practically implement the local ownership principle. Its
functioning may be briefly described as follows.4 At first, the requesting state
prepares its own long-term, holistic vision for the future. Then, at the strategic level,
3 Among the most important international initiatives occurred in recent years in the field of aid delivery
to development countries, see the 2002 Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, the 2003
Rome Declaration on Aid Harmonization, and the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness.
4 The model described is voluntarily restricted to bodies and documents of interest to the present article.
For a complete description see OECD-DAC (2005) and World Bank (2004). See also Eggen and Bezemer
(2007).
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the government drafts a PRSP or, at an earlier stage, an Interim PRSP (I-PRSP),
which basically draws broad development policies. The latter are divided into
macro-areas and more specific sectors of intervention, as they also contain time-
bound medium-term objectives and priorities (World Bank 2004: 4). The PRSP is
complemented by sector strategies, one for each development sector (OECD-DAC
2005: 42). At the operational level, a sector strategy is realized through a specific,
time-bound and costed set of actions and activities, included into a sector
development programme (SDP)5 (Ibid.: 37). There then follows the creation of
consultative groups (CGs), participated jointly by all the relevant stakeholders
(national and international) within distinct sectors of interest, but chaired by the
local government. The CGs are in turn aligned with the PRSP sectors, so that they
practically represent the main policy-making fora for each development area. At the
lower level, sector and thematic working groups are created in order to address sub-
sector policies. Again, such groups are mixed international/national, but they are led
by the relevant government institutions. Finally, the whole structure is monitored by
a high-level institution (presided over by the government) in charge of coordinating
government agencies with international partners (World Bank 2004: 17). Therefore,
the system is basically composed of ‘technical-level bodies to facilitate practical
work, donor-co-ordination bodies, ad hoc working groups to tackle specific issues
… and a wider consultative forum … that allows participation by a range of
stakeholders’ (OECD-DAC 2005: 51). As the following paragraphs will show, this
represents the model used to shape the aid architecture in Afghanistan.
The Lead Nation Approach
The institutional reform in Afghanistan started in Tokyo, on 22 January 2002 at the
end of the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan. In
addition to their financial commitments in the reconstruction, a few donor countries
were entrusted with the ‘lead’ in the reform of specific sectors within the ‘security
and rule of law’ area. Italy took the responsibility for leading the reform of the
Afghan justice system. At the Conference, an ‘implementation group’ was also
established as a high level monitoring institution. It initially convened in Kabul on
10–11 April 2002 and in October of the same year. In April 2002 the government
released the national development framework (NDF), comprised of 12 national
development programmes. The reform of justice was then conceived as a segment
of a wider ‘security and the rule of law programme’, which was in turn
encompassed within the ‘governance and security’ pillar. Programme groups,
programme secretariats and programme working groups were also established and
aligned with the NDF. In December 2002, the programme groups were replaced by
CGs, mandated to coordinate key government agencies and donor organizations
within the NDF and the full range of national reconstruction programmes. Every CG
included a focal point, designated by the lead Ministry, which replaced the existing
5 A sector development programme is defined by the OECD-DAC as a specific, time-bound and costed
set of actions and activities which support a sector strategy.
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programme secretariat. Justice was one among the five working groups contained in
CG No. 2 (security and rule of law). The Justice Sector Consultative Group (JSCG)
was created in January 2003, although its formal terms of reference were only
agreed upon in 2005. The JSCG was chaired by the MoJ, with Italy being the donor
focal point. In addition, both UNAMA (i.e. the UN Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan) and Italy were granted the chairs of ad hoc working groups on specific
topics.
Generally speaking, the ‘lead nation approach’ generated a donor-oriented
system, with broad bilateralization of planning and programming. The national
budget request for the justice sector, for years 2003–2004, was $27 million and
was almost entirely covered by the Italian government with a contribution of
$20 million. In addition, at the same time, most of the adopted laws were influenced
by external actors. This was the case, for instance, with the new 2004 Interim
Criminal Procedure Law, the 2005 Juvenile Code, and the 2005 Law on Prisons and
Detention Centres, drafted with main inputs offered by the Italian Justice Project
Office. Under this bilateral scheme, donors were supposed to perform justice reform
by influencing the political will of local authorities through direct financial and
technical support. However, on the one hand, at the beginning the financial
assistance was even too fast, given the country’s slow absorption capacities; on the
other hand, the changes in national politics have been partial at best (UNDP 2004:
144). This might be due to the limited powers, financial capacities and expertise of
the selected ‘lead nations’. According to the RAND Corporation research director in
the field of state-building, James Dobbins, ‘Italy simply lacked the expertise,
resources, interest and influence needed to succeed in such an undertaking’
(Dobbins et al. 2007: 101). Criticism against Italian activities has been also recently
pointed out by the International Crisis Group (2008: 6). Besides, the failure of the
lead nation approach in Afghanistan is not only restricted to the justice sector.
Indeed the lack of success concerns all the ‘leads’ and it is probably due to very
similar reasons.
The End of the Bonn Process: A Turning Point?
A major evolution within the justice sector policy-making structure began in 2005.
Early that year, the government had started preparing its long-term vision, which
was included in the Afghanistan first Millennium Development Goals Country
Report, presented in September at the UN World Summit in New York
(Government of Afghanistan—GoA 2005b). On 15 August 2005, the ‘Justice for
All’ policy paper (GoA 2005a) was delivered at a National Justice Consultative
Conference, held in Kabul. The document, which was further revised and finally
adopted on 10 October 2005, represented the primary medium-term development
strategy for the sector, covering a period of up to 12 years. Its drafting involved staff
from the MoJ, AGO, Supreme Court, as well as international advisors from the UN
and other international actors (Center for Policy and Human Development—CPHD
2007: 120). Other crucial developments occurred at the London Conference on
Afghanistan, which took place at the end of January 2006. The conference saw
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the signing of the Afghanistan Compact (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan—IRA
2006a) and the presentation of the Interim Afghanistan National Development
Strategy (I-ANDS) (IRA 2006b), which also represented the country’s I-PRSP. The
former was basically a political agreement between the GoA and the international
community towards the achievement of 42 benchmarks within a 5-year term. The
Compact’s rule of law component was comprised of four benchmarks, which
mirrored those contained within the I-ANDS. Such benchmarks were related to the
adoption and dissemination of new codes and laws, the establishment of functioning
justice institutions, the adoption of anti-corruption procedures, as well as the
construction and rehabilitation of judicial infrastructure. The event also created the
Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB, established in April 2006),
designed to monitor progress towards the achievement of the benchmarks included
in the Compact.
As a consequence, the CGs were reformed to align with the I-ANDS structure,
having two main functions: to coordinate the implementation of I-ANDS
programmes, and to assist in preparing the national budget. The new policy-
making structure was then reformed. Still, nowadays it consists of a Government
Oversight Committee (OSC), a Consultative Group Standing Committee (led by the
Ministry of Finance, lately replaced by a Coordination Team–CT), eight CGs (one
for each I-ANDS sector, grouped in turn into three macro-pillars), five Cross-
Cutting Thematic Groups (one for each cross-cutting sector), and 28 working
groups. The CGs receive indications from the WGs. Such indications are further
collected into reports to be sent to the OSC through the CT (GoA 2007). The
information contained in these reports is eventually used for presentations made
during the JCMB quarterly meetings. Among the CGs, CG No. 2, entitled
‘Governance, rule of law and human rights’, has approximately 75 members, of
whom more than a half are international experts (CPHD 2007: 121). It is divided
into eight working groups, one of which is the (advisory) rule of law working group
(RoL WG), chaired by the MoJ, with UNAMA and Italy being key international
partners. The RoL WG itself includes sub-working groups on particular topics.
Since March 2007, all the WGs and sub-WGs were renamed Technical Working
Groups (TWGs). The TWGs included within the RoL WG are now: (1) law reform
(divided into a Criminal Law Committee and a Civil Law Committee), (2) justice
physical infrastructure, (3) justice institutions and judicial reform (divided into three
committees on the reform of Judiciary, AGO and MoJ, respectively), (4) legal
education and training (sub-WGs on legal higher education, professional training,
establishment of the National Legal Training Centre), (5) access to justice and legal
aid, and (6) corrections (sub-WGs on reconstruction and rehabilitation of prisons,
training, administrative reforms, establishment of a high maximum security facility
at Pol-i-Charki prison). In addition, it is provided with a Technical Advisory Group
on Women and Children in Justice (TAG). CG No. 2 also includes other working
groups somehow related to justice: land registration/reform, human rights (including
transitional justice), counter-narcotics and anti-corruption (UNAMA 2007: 4).
The opening of the London Conference marked up the ‘the end of the Bonn
process’ (Deledda 2006). However, even though the basic pillars of the new justice
system could be considered established, the local ownership of sector reform was
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still missing. With the increasing number of IFIs activities within the Afghan
‘reconstruction market’ and the growing US financial and material assistance,
the role of ‘lead nations’ was rapidly reconsidered to that of ‘key partners’.
Notwithstanding the increasing use of pooled financing mechanisms—i.e. the trust
funds administered by WB and UNDP—to support the reform of Afghan public
administration, justice sector development was still passing through a myriad of
single projects, each advancing independently. The need for more coordination
among donors led to the establishment of the International Coordination Group
for Justice Reform (ICGJR) on 31 October 2006, in order to improve donor
communication regarding justice sector policies. Accordingly, the International
Coordination for Legal Training (ICLT) was constituted on 7 May 2007, as
an ICGJR sub-working group, with the aim of coordinating the plethora of
legal training programmes operated by a number of international agencies and
organizations. However, improving coordination among donors does not necessarily
mean to improve the local ownership of reforms as well. Indeed, the path towards its
achievement still lacked a fundamental step, being the Afghan government’s
adoption of a clear policy framework for sector development.
From Rome to Paris and Beyond: Broadening the Ownership of Reforms
The process of gradually empowering national actors with the decision over the
reform of justice evolved with the outcome of the Conference on the rule of law in
Afghanistan, held in Rome at the beginning of July 2007. The event represented a
cornerstone for the evolution of sector policies and paved the way to a new process
of reforms, oriented towards the full Afghan ownership. At the Conference, it was
decided to set up, within the ANDS framework, a National Justice Sector Strategy
(NJSS) to be implemented by a National Justice Programme (NJP), under the logic
of a ‘Sector-Wide Approach’ (SWAP).6 The NJP, in particular, was initially
conceived as a SDP—derived from the sector strategy. The Programme would be
finalized with the assistance of the WB and funded in significant part through the
ARTF. This would also imply the establishment of a pooled financing mechanism
for justice development, i.e. the creation of a ‘justice sector reform project’ (ARTF
Justice Project), financially sustained by the ARTF and administered by Afghan
authorities with the overall control performed by donors and the WB. Operationally,
such multilateral approach was intended to gradually replace the ‘bilateralization of
aid assistance’ (see e.g. Macrae 2002) experimented at the beginning of the
international intervention. This would have implied an evolution from a ‘supply-
driven’ to a ‘demand-driven’ approach, characterized by the capacity of Afghan
Government to articulate a plan for sector development, which in turn would have
expanded the local ownership of reforms. In addition, at the Rome Conference
6 There is not an agreed definition of SWAP. The most commonly used is that of Mick Foster, according
to whom a SWAP is when ‘funding for the sector supports a single sector policy and expenditure
programme, under Government leadership, adopting common approaches across the sector, and
progressing towards relying on Government procedures to disburse and account for all funds’ (Foster
2000: 9).
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donors agreed to adopt a coordinated approach towards the reconstruction of justice
at central and provincial levels. To this aim, it was decided to establish a provincial
justice coordination mechanism (PJCM), chaired by UNAMA, as well as to finance
15 high priority, quick implementation projects presented by Afghan justice
institutions (five projects each). In the state-building theory, this method to collect
funds (also called the ‘wedding registry’ budget) is normally portrayed as an interim
step towards the full autonomy of government to produce a proper development
budget (Carnahan et al. 2004: 24).
On the other hand, the process of adoption of both the NJSS and the NJP was
rather extensive and problematic. At the Rome Conference, a seminar for their
adoption was planned to take place in October of the same year in Kabul. As the
conditions for its organization were lacking, all the stakeholders began to
concentrate most of their efforts on coordinating documents and policies, in order
to shape a more rational and coherent policy-making system. Indeed, it was decided
that justice sector reform should adapt to the broader national development strategy,
to be adopted in the forthcoming months. Eventually, after extensive consultation,
on 23 February 2008 the ANDS final draft was circulated among stakeholders. It
included the Draft NJSS as an attachment. A month later (24 March 2008), the NJP
final draft was presented to the donors during a special session of the ICGJR. As
initial criticisms by both the IMF and the WB about the ANDS document appeared
in the media (Boone 2008), the National Development Strategy was completely
redrafted and simplified. The document lost all its attachments, which were kept
separate and were individually adopted by relevant government agencies. On 21
April 2008 the ANDS was finally approved by the President of Afghanistan and
submitted to the Boards of both the IMF and the WB, being also the country’s
PRSP. On the very same day, the final version of the NJSS was presented for
approval to the Afghan justice institutions, which signed the document in early May.
As for the NJP, at the time of writing (end of May 2008), consultations regarding its
final adoption were still under way. Yet, all three documents will be presented to the
donors at the imminent pledging conference for Afghanistan, to take place in Paris
on 12 June 2008.
A Mixed Ownership Regime?
Although this process should rationally lead to a wider integration of all
reconstruction activities within the justice sector, this target appears to be still
challenging. Generally, recent research based on empirical findings support the idea
that aid development is often marked by scarce coordination among donors (Thiele
et al. 2007: 614; Mascarenhas and Sandler 2006). In Afghanistan, this seems
particularly true, as recently observed by the ICG (ICG 2008: 12). According to
Zalmay Khalilzad, US representative to the UN, ‘As things stand, more than 30
national embassies and bilateral development agencies, several United Nations
agencies, four development banks and IFIs, and about 2,000 nongovernmental
organizations and contractors are involved in rebuilding in (the country) (Khalilzad
2008). Coordinating this plethora of international actors (often pursuing different
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and competing interests) with national agencies, aiming at securing the local
ownership of reforms, is naturally an uneasy job. With the recent adoption of the
UN Security Council resolution No. 1806, an expanded coordinating role has been
conferred to UNAMA, notwithstanding the current scarcity of personnel and
capacities, especially within its Rule of Law Unit. Naturally, the lack of
coordination does not spare the justice sector (Tondini 2007: 346), as was
extensively reported during the Rome Conference (Bassiouni and Rothenberg 2007:
10). However, apart from that, other factors indicate that the Afghan ownership over
justice reform is yet to be met and that we are probably experimenting a mixed
regime, in which external players still influence de facto the decision-making
process.
Examples of this trend can be found at both the policy-making and the
operational level. At first, however, the local ownership of reforms is seriously put
at risk by the country’s economic and financial dependence on external aid, as well
as by the way funds are disbursed. International assistance represents around 90%
of all public expenditure, while some two-thirds of aid bypasses the Afghan
government, being spent bilaterally by donors (Waldman 2008). As for the reform
of justice, apparently this trend will not cease in the future. This may be proven by a
comparison between the limited funds that will be channelled multilaterally (i.e.
through the ARTF Justice Project, which will initially cost only $27 million) and
the incredible number of projects to be implemented bilaterally in the near future, as
reported in the NJP. The dependency is even amplified by the donors’ practice of
disbursing less money than initially pledged. For instance, at the Rome Conference
donors agreed to offer $360 million for justice reform. However, countries included
in their pledges, money that was previously promised but not been spent yet. As a
consequence, the total amount of contributions was broadly over quoted, resulting in
only $60 million in ‘fresh cash’.
At the strategic level, the application of the local ownership principle in
reshaping the new sector’s policy-making structure has been, at best, partial. With
regard to the NJP, the document was initially drafted by a dedicated working group,
whose participants were almost completely international, except for a representative
of the ANDS Secretariat. The document is made up of four parts: (1) an introductory
chapter, (2) a logical framework of actions, expected results and bottlenecks, (3) the
ARTF Justice Project (which represents the Programme’s multilateral funding
channel), and (4) a matrix of future activities to be carried out bilaterally by donors.
While the first part was entirely drafted by the dedicated working team, the second
one was finalized with major contributions from a representative of a foreign
embassy. The third part was instead drawn up by the WB, and then amended after
requests made by donors. The fourth part was prepared by UNAMA, with relevant
inputs coming from contributing states. UNAMA also set up the matrix of current
reconstruction activities, contained in the first annex to the document. Conversely,
the sole Afghan stakeholder involved in the drafting process, i.e. the ANDS
Secretariat, only prepared the second annex to the document, including priorities
identified through consultations at provincial level.
The lack of inputs by local actors in the drafting process may be due to a number
of reasons. They may probably include the limited capacity of local personnel to
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contribute to such a complex document, which requires specific skills, and also the
determination of international actors to complete the NJP as quickly as possible.
However, this can also stem from the poor interest of the Afghan authorities
themselves. Indeed, so far the latter have appeared reluctant to be absorbed in
difficult tasks like that of preparing a complicated aid development framework for
the sector, and more inclined to use their powers after the completion of the initial
drafting process. At that stage, they can successfully bargain their ‘institutional
weight’ with that of other external actors, in order to obtain a major role within the
designed policy-making structure. In fact, at the time of writing, notwithstanding the
meagre contribution of local experts to its original contents, extensive consultations
among Afghan government agencies over the NJP final text are delaying its official
endorsement.
The NJSS approval process may be regarded as another example of such a
trend. The document’s framework was initially conceived during Summer 2007 by
a UNDP officer seconded to the ANDS Secretariat. The draft paper was then
completely reviewed in September 2007 by a dedicated working group (whose
members were, once again, all but one international) and sent to both the ANDS
Secretariat and donors. The latter made various comments which were further
included into the draft by the same working group. At that point the document was
translated into Dari (by a US contractor and another international organization)
and resubmitted to the ANDS Secretariat in order to be circulated among the
Supreme Court, the AGO and the MoJ. Following on from that, a number of
discussion tables among international and national stakeholders took place at the
ANDS Secretariat. At the end, other modifications were included in the document,
as required by Afghan justice institutions. The final draft was then sent again to
the ANDS Secretariat, which made a few formal amendments and finally
published it in a restricted area of its website, in order to circulate it before its
official adoption.
At the operational level the ‘mixed ownership regime’ of reforms seems even
more apparent. Membership and powers of TWGs, sub-WGs and committees
established within the RoL WG are based on terms of reference agreed by the MoJ.
This would formally preserve the authority of state institutions, though it remains to
be seen how effectively such authority is exercised. Among the TWGs, those within
the Law Reform TWG are probably the fora in which the local ownership principle
is better implemented. Although their meetings are normally held at international
offices, the Government’s chairmanship is not always granted (e.g. the Criminal
Law Committee is chaired jointly by UNODC and JSSP—Justice Sector Support
Programme—a US contractor). In addition, the weight of Afghan members differs
from group to group. Generally, their influence varies with the ability of
international experts to involve the local counterparts in the works. The final aim
should be that of creating a common will towards the adoption of laws and
regulations which comply with international norms and standards but that also
respect local legal traditions. This is possible only if Afghan members understand
their significance, and above all, their usefulness. Besides, TWGs are strictly
consultative bodies. The last decision over the adoption of laws or policies remains
in the hands of Afghan institutions. Sometimes, as in the case of some articles
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contained in the forthcoming new Police Law, local authorities are unwilling to
accept amendments suggested by international experts. Obviously, this whole
negotiation process delays the approval of new norms. Nevertheless, it is essential in
order to create the preconditions for such norms to be effectively abided by people,
once they come into force. However, this open procedure does not prevent external
actors from putting some pressure on the adoption of specific laws, requesting
amendments to the annual legislative plan or rather organizing a seminar abroad
(held in Siracusa—Italy—at the end of April 2008), inter alia, to offer inputs taken
from international manuals to the upcoming new criminal procedure code.
Besides, de facto influence of international actors over justice sector reform may
be powerful at any rate. It can take the form of legal advisors or ‘mentors’ seconded
to justice institutions, as was done by the EU/EC missions and by several US
contractors, as well as recently advocated by UNAMA. International consultants
cover positions at all levels, including personal advisors to the highest sector’s
authorities. Sometimes, influence is exercised by the creation of privileged
relationships between such authorities and international representatives, as was
the case, for example, with the business lunches organized on a regular basis
between representatives of two international agencies and the Attorney General.
Occasionally, international actors operate as guarantors, by playing the role of
promoting confidence-building among Afghan institutions. The Ministry of
Interior—Attorney General’s Office Commission, born to facilitate the establish-
ment of good relationships between the two institutions, is being held under the
auspices of a number of representatives of international agencies, being the US
(through its contractor JSSP), Germany, Italy (both through their development
cooperation agencies) and the EU Police Mission.
Concluding Remarks
Contrary to appearances, the mixed regime which characterizes the decision-making
process within justice sector reform in Afghanistan may be considered as an
evolution. It is far from the ‘bilateralization of aid assistance’ registered at the
beginning of the international intervention and it has the merit of being open to a
wider number of stakeholders, including the growing key role of government
authorities. How genuinely the system is oriented towards the achievement of full
Afghan ownership will be revealed when the real intentions of donors is unveiled.
This will happen when they are asked to support principally pooled financing
mechanisms for the justice area, and reduce bilateral projects, as recently requested
by the new Special Representative of the Secretary General, Kay Eide (quoted in
Hemming 2008). Indeed, the path from the lead nation approach to the local
ownership of reforms may be described with the loosing of political interests by
single contributing nations and the birth of a real common political end-state, being
that of truly establishing a functioning sovereign nation. In this respect, the growing
lack of confidence among all the stakeholders, as testified, e.g. by the huge number
of US bilateral projects listed into the NJP, is the most serious danger that threatens
the success of future reforms.
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